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A Theory of Entrepreneurial Overconfidence, Effort,
and Firm Outcomes
Craig R. Everett1
Pepperdine University
Graziadio School of Business and Management
Richard J. Fairchild
University of Bath
School of Management

ABSTRACT
We present a theory of entrepreneurial behavior that explores the relationship between overconfidence and
successful firm outcomes, such as acquisition or IPO. In our model, increasing overconfidence produces
two conflicting effects on the probability of a successful outcome: it not only induces an entrepreneur to
increase the riskiness of a venture (which lowers the likelihood of successful exit), but also drives higher
entrepreneurial effort, increasing likelihood of a successful exit. Due to this conflict, a kinked or U-shaped
relationship may exist between overconfidence and positive outcomes. Furthermore, our model suggests
that increased outside equity mitigates the effects of overconfidence.
Keywords: Overconfidence, Entrepreneurship, Cognitive Bias, IPO, Mergers & Acquisitions
JEL Codes: G32, G34, L26, M13

I.

Introduction

In our theoretical analysis, entrepreneurial overconfidence may induce the
entrepreneur to increase the volatility of the start-up, resulting in a greater probability of
failure. However, it may also induce higher entrepreneurial efforts, increasing the
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probability of a successful outcome. Trading-off these two factors, our model suggests
that the relationship between overconfidence and the probability of success may be
kinked, which could manifest itself empirically as a roughly U-shaped relationship. Thus
the highest probabilities of entrepreneurial success arise from the extremes of either low
or high overconfidence.
According to data published by the U.S. Small Business Administration, from
2000 to 2004 there were consistent employment losses among large firms. During that
same period, there were consistent employment gains among small businesses (defined as
less than 20 employees). In 2004, small business generated 29% of total new jobs, but
if job losses are netted out for that year, small businesses are actually responsible for 96%
of overall employment gains (SBA, 2007).
Startup firms account for approximately one-third of small business job growth
in the U.S. Economy (SBA, 2007). As such, they are a critical engine for economic
growth and a potentially rich source of returns for investors. Unfortunately, the return
on investment in private startups is not higher than public equity returns, even though
it carries substantially higher risk (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). The poor
average investment performance is driven primarily by the high failure rate of startup
firms. Half of new companies close within four years and only 40% are still in existence
after six years (Headd, 2003).
As a primary driver of employment growth, entrepreneurship is generally viewed
as a net economic benefit to society. But if starting a business involves too much risk for
too little return, then why do people do it? It is clear that entrepreneurs are not mainly
motivated in their business efforts by philanthropic urges to help the macro economy.
They start businesses because they identify an opportunity to succeed and be profitable,
and even though they are statistically unlikely to achieve that goal it does not appear to
stop them from trying. The fact that entrepreneurs expend effort and resources in the
pursuit of improbable success can be intuitively interpreted as overconfidence. This
paper addresses the questions of how the level of entrepreneurial overconfidence impacts
both the success and failure of startup firms, and the degree to which outside investment
mitigates the negative effects of overconfidence.
Although there are many theories that address the motivations of entrepreneurs,
most can agree that at its heart, entrepreneurship is a principle of action (McMullen &
Shepherd, 2006). Indeed, action is the defining distinction between an entrepreneur and
a dreamer. There is a burgeoning body of literature that tries to get inside the seemingly
irrational mind of the entrepreneur. Two facts emerge about what makes these people
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tick: 1) they tend to be overconfident in their abilities and 2) they tend to be
overconfident in their likelihood of success (Hayward et al., 2006).
This may be bad news for outside investors, who presumably prefer that a
business plan be realistic and account for risk appropriately. An overconfident
entrepreneur will have difficulty being fully rational in evaluating the firm’s investment
opportunities because, by definition, overconfidence in either ability or likelihood of
success will cause the opportunity to be overvalued. Since a typical stockholder’s primary
desire is to maximize financial returns, it is not beneficial if the entrepreneur has other
motivations, such as the thrill of managing a new venture in a high-risk industry. Thus,
it is important that the entrepreneur has his incentives aligned tightly with the outside
stockholders.
It stands to reason, therefore, that overconfidence may be associated with lower
success. Success in the world of externally funded startups is commonly defined as having
a successful exit, meaning that the firm is acquired by another company or goes public
via initial public offering (IPO). Either of these two events generally allows existing
investors to liquidate their equity position in the firm – and hopefully at a profit.
Overconfidence has been deeply investigated as it relates to the behavior of
investors in efficient or nearly efficient markets, such as public equity markets. In such
environments, overconfidence is considered a negative factor, since it causes the investor
to deviate from optimal decisions.
However, a debate exists regarding whether overconfidence is necessarily an
undesirable entrepreneurial characteristic. There are compelling arguments on both
sides. For example, Statman and Tyebjee (1985), Pruitt and Gitman (1987), Heaton
(2002), and Malmendier and Tate (2002), argue that overconfident managers
overestimate the quality of their projects in the capital budgeting process, and hence
overinvest into value-destroying projects. Gervais et al. (2003) employ a real-options
game theoretic framework in which managerial risk-aversion may induce a manager to
delay investment sub-optimally. Overconfidence may mitigate this problem, since it
induces a manager to invest early. Kahnemann and Lovallo (1993) argue that managerial
optimism may lead to managers making “bold forecasts” regarding prospective projects,
while at times making timid choices due to risk-aversion.
In terms of capital structure, Shefrin (1999), and Hackbarth (2002) have argued
that overconfidence may induce managers to take on excessively high levels of valuedestroying debt for their corporations. However, similar to our analysis, Fairchild’s
(2005) capital structure analysis demonstrates that overconfidence may have negative
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(excessive debt levels, resulting in higher financial distress costs) and positive effects
(overconfidence results in higher value-creating effort levels).2 A firm’s value experiences
a trade-off between the negative and positive attributes of overconfidence.
Overconfidence within the operational management of a firm, however, has
additional motivational effects that do not apply to passive investors in public securities
markets. An overly optimistic self-view, or an unreasonably low estimate of project risk,
can motivate the manager to undertake more ambitious goals and persist in the face of
adversity (Benabou and Tirole, 2002). The presence of outside investors, however, may
have a disciplinary effect on the entrepreneur, hopefully leading him to circumscribe his
overconfident behavior and make rational decisions for the benefit of the firm and all its
investors.
This paper posits a game theoretical model of a kinked relationship between
overconfidence and the firm’s ultimate disposition. The contribution of this paper is to
provide a theoretical explanation of how overconfidence and entrepreneurial effort are
related, and why the association between overconfidence and outcomes may not be
smooth and linear.

II.

Background and Related Literature

Relevant research papers on overconfidence are found in various fields, including
(but not limited to) entrepreneurship, finance, economics, psychology and strategy. The
factors that we address in this paper with respect to their impact on the final disposition
of a startup firm are: 1) the overconfidence of the entrepreneur/founder and its potential
effects on performance, and 2) the mitigating impact of outside venture capital on the
effects of overconfidence.
A.

Cognitive Origins of Overconfidence

Overconfidence is essentially a distorted view of the world where the actor has
expectations of personal performance that exceed the level that would be otherwise

2

This idea is consistent with Knight’s (1921) stance that entrepreneurial action depends, at least in part,
upon the actor’s belief that he can successfully exploit the identified opportunity.

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 17, No. 1 • Spring 2015

5

justified by an unbiased examination of the facts. These systematic distortions of reality
are called cognitive biases. It is commonly understood that the human brain has
developed these biases as shortcuts to deal with having to process too much information
in too short a time (Baron, 1998).
There are three primary categories of overconfidence: 1) overconfidence in
knowledge, 2) overconfidence in prediction, and 3) overconfidence in abilities (Hayward
et al., 2006). Overconfidence in knowledge refers to the entrepreneur’s view that he is
more knowledgeable than is truly the case. This can either be a tendency to overestimate
the correctness of an original estimate and cling to it (Bazerman, 1994), or simply
excessive certainty about one’s command of the relevant facts of the situation (Busenitz
and Barney, 1997). Within the entrepreneurial context, overconfidence in prediction
refers to the systematic underestimation of the risk involved in a new venture (Yazdipour
and Constand, 2010). Entrepreneurs are notoriously susceptible to this bias. 81% of
firm founders estimate their chance of success at greater than 70% and a full third of
founders estimate their chance of success at an unfathomable 100% (Cooper, Woo and
Dunkleberg, 1988). An entrepreneur who is overconfident in ability may correctly
estimate the risk of a venture, but believes that, unlike his peers, his unique skills will
allow him to overcome the odds and succeed anyway (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin,
2006). Overconfidence in ability is not unique to entrepreneurs, but is common in
professions that are highly complex. For example, 94% of college professors feel that
they have higher ability than their peers (Gilovich, 1991). In this paper, we focus on the
effects of ability overconfidence.

B.

Overconfidence in Ability

The primary driver of overconfidence in ability, skill or knowledge is attribution
bias. This refers to the tendency of people to attribute successes to their own ability,
while attributing their failures to outside factors. When an actor applies Bayes Rule to
update his beliefs about his own ability, there will be a tendency to overweight successes
and underweight failures. Over time, however, this bias diminishes as the evidence
becomes overwhelming and the overconfident actor ultimately becomes aware of his true
ability level (Gervais and Odean, 2001). Successful entrepreneurs have been shown to
possess lower levels of attribution bias than their unsuccessful peers (Baron, 1998),
confirming the intuition that there is a negative relationship between this type of
overconfidence and performance.

6
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The interrelated factors of age, experience and education have also been shown
to influence overconfidence in ability. Taylor (1995) shows that both age and amount
of management experience are negatively related to confidence. A higher level of
education, on the other hand, appears to make people more sure of themselves than is
justified (Lichtenstein and Fichoff, 1977). Likewise, the behavior of young, small firms
is consistent with overconfident managers (Forbes, 2005). Gender has also been shown
to be a factor, with men being consistently more overconfident than women in activities
such as investing (Barber and Odean, 2001).

C.

Measuring Overconfidence

A difficulty with testing the effects of overconfidence on financial decisionmaking is finding a good measure for overconfidence itself, which is a fundamentally
unobservable characteristic. The most influential early attempt was provided by
Malmendier and Tate (2002), who used executive stock option exercise decisions3 as a
proxy for overconfidence.
Subsequently, Malmendier and Tate (2005) used an
alternative measure: press releases that described individual entrepreneur characteristics
as optimistic or pessimistic. Barros and da Silveira (2008) used a simple classification:
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Combined with this, they analyze other, more
directly observable characteristics, such as gender, level of education, and age. Oliver
(2010) used the Michigan consumer sentiment index.
Hence, due to the non-observability of managerial overconfidence, researchers
have either employed managerial actions (such as executive stock option exercise) as
indirect proxies for overconfidence, or direct reports from outside observers, such as press
releases.
In this paper, we suggest entrepreneurial level of effort (or alternatively changes
in level of effort) as a proxy for overconfidence. Negative changes in effort may result
from increasing overconfidence as the entrepreneur becomes ‘more comfortable’ with his
firm, while positive changes in effort may be due to an escalation of commitment/project
entrapment (see, e.g. Statman and Caldwell, 1987). Regardless, it is intuitively clear that

3

Malmendier and Tate (2002) argue that an overconfident executive would delay exercise of stock options
too long, rather than rationally diversify as soon as possible.
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an entrepreneur will only expend effort on the enterprise if he is confident that his effort
will positively impact the enterprise’s probability of success. Otherwise he would be
knowingly wasting effort. One approach to measuring entrepreneurial effort is the one
used by Bitler, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005), who use hours worked by the
entrepreneur as a proxy for level of effort.
III.

Model of Entrepreneurial Overconfidence and Effort
A.

Model Setup

We consider an entrepreneur E who runs a start-up business. The objective of
the E is to take the start-up towards a successful exit outcome, such as IPO or acquisition.
The E has an equity stake   [0,1] in the business, with the remainder of equity 1  
being held by outsiders. All players are risk neutral, and the risk-free rate is zero.
The E makes two choices: a) which project to invest in (a safe or a risky project),
and b) how much effort to exert in developing the start-up towards exit. The specific
timeline of the game is as follows:
Date 0: The entrepreneur chooses between two projects: a risky one or a safe
one. The safe project achieves Date 2 success for sure, which brings Date 2 income
S  0. The risky project has two possible Date 2 outcomes: ‘success’ (that is, a successful
exit) or failure. In the case of success, the risky project provides Date 2 income R  S  0.
In the case of failure, the risky project provides zero Date 2 income. The probability of
success or failure is affected by the E’s Date 1 effort level, as described below.
4

Date 1: If the E chose the safe project, it will succeed for sure, and the E does
not need to exert any effort. If the E chose the risky project, he exerts effort e in taking
the venture towards an exit. The E faces a cost-of-effort  e 2 (which demonstrates
increasing marginal cost of effort).

4

The reader may wonder about the realism of this scenario – what kind of entrepreneur chooses a 100%
safe project? It may be useful to think of this project choice from the standpoint of a potential entrepreneur,
who is deciding whether to keep his day job, which is completely safe, or to quit the day job and take the
plunge into full-time entrepreneurship, which would be the risky project.
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His effort affects the probability of success for the risky project. Specifically, the
probability of success is PR  e, where  represents entrepreneurial ability.
In our model, the E may be overconfident in his ability. We model this as follows.
The E’s perceived ability parameter in the case of the risky project is ˆ   . In the case
that ˆ   , the E is rational/well-calibrated. Increasing overconfidence is represented by
increasing ˆ in excess of  .
Date 2: The chosen project either succeeds or fails, and the E, and the outside
investors, receive their payoffs.
We solve the game by backward induction. First, we take as given the E’s Date 0
project choice, and solve for his optimal Date 1 effort level. Then we move back to Date
0 to solve for his equilibrium project choice. Our objective is to examine the effects of
overconfidence on these decisions.

B.

Date 1: E’s Effort Choices

If the E chose the safe project5 at Date 0, it succeeds for certain. Hence, he does
not need to exert any effort. The value of the safe project is (trivially):
VS  S .

(1)

The E’s payoff is

 E  S .

(2)

Now, consider the case where the E has chosen the risky project at date 0. The
expected value of the project is

VR  PR  eR.

5

(3)

We assume that the firm consists of only the one project chosen. Hence, throughout, we refer to the firm
and the project interchangeably. Effectively, the value of the project is identical to the value of the firm.
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The E is overconfident, and perceives the value of the project6 to be:
(4)
VˆR  Pˆ R  ˆeR.
He chooses his effort level to maximize his perceived payoff

ˆ  ˆeR  e 2 .

E

(5)

We emphasize that this is the E’s perceived payoff (represented by the ‘hat’), since
it incorporates the perceived ability parameter, which may be greater than the true ability
ˆ

E
 0. Next, we
parameter: ˆ   . We obtain his optimal effort level by solving
e
substitute this optimal effort level into his perceived payoff (5).
We also substitute his optimal effort level into the true success probability
PR  e, and the true firm value V  PR R  eR.
We thus obtain our first result in the case of the risky and safe projects.
Proposition 1:
a) If the E has chosen the risky project at date 0, his optimal effort level, his
perception of success probability, his perception of firm value, and his perceived payoff,
is as follows:
eR * 

ˆ 2 R ˆ
ˆ 2 R 2 ˆ
 2ˆ 2 R 2
ˆR ˆ
, VR * 
, R * 
.
, PR * 
2
2
4
2

He is overconfident ( ˆ   ), and the true success probability, true firm value,
and his true payoff, is as follows:

ˆR 2
 2 R 2 [2ˆ  ˆ 2 ]
ˆR
, R * 
.
PR * 
, VR * 
2
4
2

Throughout the text, variables identified with X̂ refers to the E’s perceived value (due to
overconfidence). Variables without the ‘hat’ refer to the true values.

6
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b) If the E has chosen the safe project, his optimal effort level is zero, since the
project succeeds for sure. Therefore, the success probability, firm value, and his payoff is
as follows7:
PS *  1, VS *  S ,  S *  S .
We note the following. In Proposition 1a), the overconfident E overestimates his
ability, and hence overestimates the effect of his effort on the success probability. Hence,
his effort level is increasing in overconfidence. Also, he overestimates the value of the
venture, and thus overestimates the payoff from the risky project.

C.

Date 0: E’s Choice of Project

We now move back to consider the effect of overconfidence on the E’s choice of
project, effort level, success probability, and venture value. In order to do so, we simply
compare the results in Proposition 1.
First, we note that the E chooses the risky project if and only if his perceived
payoff from doing so exceeds his perceived payoff from the safe project: that is, iff

 2ˆ 2 R 2
 S.
4

(6)

In order to make the analysis interesting, we assume the following:

 2 2 R 2
 S.
4

7

(Assumption 1).

Note that in the case of the safe project, we assume that he is well-calibrated, so that his perception of
success probability, firm value, and his payoff is correct (in contrast to the risky project, where he is
overconfident).
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That is, the E’s true payoff under the safe project is higher than that under the
risky project. Therefore, a well calibrated E (for whom ˆ   ) will choose the safe
project.
We define a critical level of overconfidence ˆ1 at which the E will switch from
the safe to the risky project. Thus, ˆ1 satisfies (6) as an equality. Hence,

ˆ1 

4S
.
R 2

(7)

Next, we derive the critical overconfidence parameter at which the value of the
risky firm rises to equal the value of the safe firm. Now, since R  S  0, there exists a
critical perceived success probability P̂11 (and therefore critical overconfidence level ˆ11 )
) at which the value of the risky project rises to equal the value of the safe project. Since
VR  PR, and VS  S , this critical probability is
S
Pˆ11   1.
R

(8)

In order to derive the critical overconfidence level, we equate (from proposition
1):

ˆR 2
 S.
2

(9)

When considering the effect of overconfidence on E’s choice of project, we
considered the E’s perceived payoff. Now, when considering the effect of overconfidence
on firm value, we consider true firm value.
The critical overconfidence level that satisfies (9) (that is, that equates the value
of the risky and the value of the safe project) is

ˆ11 

2S
R 2 .

(10)

Next, it is interesting to consider the effect of overconfidence on the probability
of success for the safe project. First, we note that, at the critical overconfidence parameter
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ˆ11 , where the value of the safe and risky projects are equated, the true success probability
of the risky project is
ˆR S
PR * 
  1.
2
R

(11)

The implication of this is that overconfidence may result in a lower success
probability for the risky project compared with the safe project, but the risky project may
have the higher expected value. Indeed, for   ˆ11 , the probability of success for the
risky project will be lower than that for the safe project, but the expected value of the
risky project will be higher (due to the higher outcome in the case of success).
Hence, empirical analysis that examines success probability only may be
understating the effect of overconfidence on expected value. We need to consider both
the success probability, and the outcome in the case of success (that is, we need to
consider the expected outcome). The success probability may be low, but the outcome
in the case of success may be high.
Finally, it is interesting to note that, for the risky project, the probability of
success can never reach 1. This is because, as the overconfident E’s perceived ability
increases, we reach the critical level of overconfidence ˆC where the E’s perceived success
probability reaches 1; that is:

ˆ 2 R
2
PˆR * 
 1  ˆC 
.
2
R

(12)

Since the E perceives the success probability to be 1, any further increase in
perceived ability will not draw forth any further effort increases (as, in the E’s perception,
this would be wasted effort: he believes that the project already succeeds for sure). Hence
the true success probability of the risky project8 is ‘capped’ at
PR * 

8

ˆR
R 


 1.
2
2 ˆC

For a proof of Equation 13, please see Appendix A.

(13)
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To complete the analysis, we compare the critical overconfidence parameters
given in (7) and (10). Equating (7) and (10), we note the following:
Lemma 1:

S
; then ˆ11  ˆ1.
R 2
S
; then ˆ1  ˆ11.
b) If the E’s true ability is sufficiently high:  
R 2

a) If the E’s true ability is sufficiently low:  

The intuition behind this result is that the E’s true ability parameter affects the
comparison of the true value of the risky and safe project (given by ˆ11 ), but does not
affect the E’s choice of project (given by ˆ1 ), since he focuses on his perceived ability.
We draw this discussion together in our main results:
Proposition 2: Effect of E’s overconfidence on project choice, success
probability, and firm value, when the E’s true ability is low:

S
; such that ˆ11  ˆ1 , then
R 2
a) If ˆ  [ , ˆ1 ], the E chooses the safe project. Success probability is 1. The value
If  

of the safe project exceeds the value of the risky project: VS  VR .
b) If ˆ  (ˆ1 , ˆ11 ], the E switches to the risky project. Success probability falls below
1. However, success probability increases as E’s overconfidence increases in this
interval. The E’s choice of project is inefficient, since the value of the safe project
remains higher than the value of the risky project: VS  VR .
c) If ˆ  ˆ11 , the E continues to take the risky project. Success probability continues
to rise as overconfidence increases. The E’s choice of project is now efficient.
Overconfidence is sufficiently high, such that VR  VS .
Furthermore,
Proposition 3: Effect of E’s overconfidence on project choice, success
probability, and firm value, when the E’s true ability is high:
If  

S
; such that ˆ1  ˆ11 , then
R 2

14
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a) If ˆ  [ , ˆ11 ], the E chooses the safe project. Success probability is 1. The value
of the safe project exceeds the value of the risky project: VS  VR .
b) If ˆ  (ˆ11 , ˆ1 ], the E continues to take the safe project. Success probability is still
1. The E’s choice of project is inefficient, since the value of the risky project is
now higher than the value of the safe project; VR  VS .
c) If ˆ  ˆ1 , the E switches to the risky project. Success probability falls below 1,
but rises as overconfidence increases. The E’s choice of project is now efficient:
VR  VS .
The only difference between Propositions 2 and 3 is in the interim interval given
in Proposition 2b) and 3b).
Propositions 2 and 3 emphasize the importance of considering both the success
probability and the outcome in the case of success. The risky project may have lower
success probability, but may have higher expected value due to the higher outcome in
the case of success.

D.

Numerical Example

In order to clarify the analysis, we now consider a numerical example9, with the
following parameters:
S  50, R  100,   0.5,   5,   5,000 .

Note that we have chosen true ability parameter   5. We noted in lemma 1
(and Proposition 2 and 3) that there exists a critical value for the true ability, such that

9

The numerical example parameters are just arbitrarily given. Gamma is not necessarily between 0 and 1.
The gamma demonstrates the effect of the Entrepreneur's effort on success probability, as P = γ * effort.
We, of course, set the parameters to ensure that P does not exceed 1. The β value relates to the cost-ofeffort. It is not a dollar value. Cost of effort relates to physical/psychological costs. As cost of effort is β
* e2, a higher beta increases the slope of the cost (and marginal cost) of effort function.
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if true ability is low, then Proposition 2 applies, and if it is high, then Proposition 3
applies. Given our parameter values in this example, the critical true value is

S
 7.071.
R 2
Therefore, we focus on low true ability parameter, such that proposition 2 holds.
Substituting the parameter values into proposition 1, we note that the true success
probability is given by
PR * 

ˆR
 0.05ˆ.
2

Therefore, the true value of the risky project is

ˆR 2
VR * 
 2.5ˆ.
2
E’s perceived payoff is
2 2 2
ˆ *   ˆ R  0.125ˆ 2 .

R
4

The critical overconfidence parameter at which E switches from the safe to the
risky project is

ˆ1 

4S
 14.14.
R 2

The critical overconfidence parameter at which the value of the risky project
becomes larger than the value of the safe project is

ˆ11 

2S
 20.
R 2 .

Therefore, ˆ11  ˆ1 , such that Proposition 2 applies. We may thus present the
following diagram.
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Figure 1. The Effect of entrepreneurial overconfidence on the expected value of the venture.
Increasing overconfidence beyond a critical level causes the entrepreneur to switch from the safe to
the risky project. However, it has the positive effect of driving higher effort levels.

Expected
Value of the Venture

2.5

 S  25

E’s
14.14

20

The E’s choice of project is represented by the thick line. Up to the critical value
ˆ1  14.14 he chooses the safe project. After this critical value, he switches to the risky
project. Until ˆ11  20 , this is inefficient, as the safe project continues to provide the
higher value. However, after ˆ11  20 overconfidence is sufficiently high that the risky
project provides higher value (due to E’s higher effort level). In summary, the analysis
contributes to the debate surrounding managerial overconfidence. We have
demonstrated that overconfidence can be value-reducing (it causes entrepreneurs to take
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too much risk: in the model, switching from the safe to the risky project).10 However, it
can be value-increasing, as overconfident entrepreneurs work harder.
The next chart considers the success probability. In our model, this U-shape
arises because overconfidence causes the E to switch from safe to risky projects, but, as
his overconfidence becomes sufficiently large, this drives higher effort. Combining the
two charts, we observe that we need to consider the effect of overconfidence both on the
success probability and the expected value. Although the probability of success is lower
in the risky case than the safe case, the risky project has higher expected value once the
level of overconfidence becomes sufficiently large (above ˆ11  20 ).
E.

Outside equity and monitoring

Thus far, we have assumed that the start-up entrepreneur is free to choose his
project (safe or risky) unhindered by outside influence. Now, we introduce the idea that
outsider equity-holders may be able to monitor the entrepreneur and affect his choice of
project.
Since the entrepreneur holds an equity stake   [0,1] in the business, outside
equity-holders hold the balancing equity-stake 1   . We model their monitoring effort
as a binary decision as follows. They can monitor the entrepreneur at cost M  0.
Monitoring is perfect, in that it enables them to prevent the entrepreneur form taking
the risky project. On the other hand, they may choose not to monitor, in which case the
entrepreneur is free to make his project choice without hindrance.
We continue to focus on the case where the entrepreneur has low true ability
(proposition 2). Firstly, we note that, in the case where the entrepreneur has low
overconfidence in his ability (Proposition 2a: ˆ  [ , ˆ1 ], ), he takes the safe project. As
this is the value-maximizing choice, outside equity-holders will not wish to monitor him.

10

The left halves of both Figures 1 and 2 are consistent with Hmielski & Baron (2009) who find that there
is a point at which increasing optimism can negatively affect firm performance. Our model differs in the
right half, where that negative impact is eventually dominated by the results of increased effort.
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Figure 2. The Effect of entrepreneurial overconfidence on the probability of a successful exit.
Increasing overconfidence beyond a critical level causes the entrepreneur to switch from the safe to the
risky project. However, it has the positive effect of driving higher effort levels.
Probability of
Successful exit

E’s OC

In the case where the entrepreneur has high overconfidence in his ability
(Proposition 2c: ˆ  ˆ11 , ), he switches to the risky project. However, his overconfidence
is sufficiently high that he works hard enough for the value of the risky project to exceed
the value of the safe project. Again, the outside equity-holders will not wish to monitor
him, as their expected wealth is maximized by his choice.
The outside equity-holders’ monitoring decision is relevant in the case where the
entrepreneur has medium overconfidence (Proposition 2b: ˆ  (ˆ1 , ˆ11 ], ). In this case,
the entrepreneur chooses the risky project, but the safe project has the higher value. In
this interval, if the outside equity holders do not monitor, their expected payoff is

O  (1   )V  (1   )

ˆR2
.
2

If they monitor, their expected payoff is
 O  (1   ) S  M .
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Therefore, they monitor if and only if:

(1   )(

ˆR 2
 S)  M .
2

That is, they monitor if their monitoring costs are sufficiently low, and if their
equity stake is sufficiently high. Note that, as outside equity decreases/inside equity
increases, both ˆ1 and ˆ11 decrease. Nevertheless, in that interval, we may state the
following result:
Proposition 4: Given that the entrepreneur wishes to invest in the risky project,
and given that this choice is value-reducing, outside equity-holders will monitor if their
outside equity is sufficiently high, given the monitoring costs. Monitoring forces the
entrepreneur to choose the safe project, increases the probability of success, and increases
the expected firm value.
If outside equity ownership is below a critical level, the outsiders do not monitor
the entrepreneur, and he takes the risky project, which reduces the probability of success,
and reduces expected venture value.
Hence, our model supports the idea that there may be a positive relationship
between outside equity and success of the start-up, due to increased incentives for
outsiders to monitor.
IV.

Implications

It is interesting to note that, in agency/moral hazard models of capital structure,
such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), an increase in inside equity/decrease in outside
equity is desirable to align managerial incentives with outside equity-holders. In our
current model, we achieve the opposite result. Why is this?
The answer comes from considering the behavioral aspects of the model. The
entrepreneur believes that he is making the optimal choice of project, but in fact is
overconfident. Now, increasing his equity stake may actually worsen the problem.
Therefore, outside equity-holders are needed to monitor him.11 This could be tested by

11

This argument is similar to that made by Shefrin (1999), who argues that, if bad managerial decisions
are simply caused by self-interested moral hazard, this can be corrected through managerial incentive
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extending empirical tests of a standard signaling model to see if there are diminishing (or
negative) signaling effects at higher levels of founder ownership because suboptimal
behavior is being driven by overconfidence rather than moral hazard.
The basic propositions of this paper are that below a certain confidence in his/her
own ability, the entrepreneur will choose the safe project and that as confidence becomes
overconfidence, there will be a structural breakpoint where the entrepreneur will switch
to the risky project and experience suboptimal results. As overconfidence increases from
there, though, the enhanced effort will increase the probability of success and payoff, as
predicted in our theoretical model. Testing this empirically requires measures for the
entrepreneur’s actual ability, overconfidence, project choice, as well as a measure for the
success or failure of the firm. This may be well suited for an experimental setting.
Alternatively, there is an intuitive real-world scenario where the entrepreneur makes the
choice to abandon the safe project for the risky project, which is the moment the
potential entrepreneur quits his day job in favor of full-time pursuit of the new business
idea.
Researchers testing our theory should keep in mind that as the entrepreneurs
move from left to right on the continuum of overconfidence, abandoning the safe
projects for the risky endeavors, by definition they are changing the risk profile of their
business. Consequently, the volatility of outcomes will tend to increase with
overconfidence and thus the researcher must test any empirical test of our model for
heteroskedasticity. The same caveat is valid for any study that attempts to measure
associations between overconfidence and performance.
In the real world, it may be much more straightforward to simplify the model,
building a measure for overconfidence in ability as the independent variable with firm
outcome as the dependent variable. Either a U-shaped relationship, or a piecewise
analysis with a steeper positive slope at high levels of overconfidence, would support the
propositions of this paper. For example, Simon & Shrader (2012) found a U-shaped
relationship between the entrepreneur’s satisfaction with company performance and their

schemes (such as increasing the manager’s equity stake). However, if bad managerial decisions come from
behavioral biases (the manager believes that he is doing the right thing for shareholders, but in reality is
mistaken), then this is much more difficult to correct through incentive schemes. Now education (or
monitoring) may be more effective.
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level of overconfidence. Assuming that satisfaction with performance is positively
correlated with actual performance, the theory presented in our paper may explain their
empirical results.
It is interesting to note that we have assumed that outside investors are fully
rational, and are thus able to objectively monitor the manager. However, there is a body
of evidence that outsiders, such as venture capitalists, may be equally overconfident in
the success of the venture. It would be interesting to include this in the model. However,
we leave this for future research.
V.

Conclusion

Startup firms account for approximately one-third of small business job growth
and thus are a critical engine for economic growth. Their efficacy as an investment is
less assured, since they carry such a high risk of failure. Half of new companies close
within four years.
Unless they are irrational, entrepreneurs must either overestimate their personal
ability to succeed in the face of very long odds, or alternatively, they must not believe
that the odds are really that long. These two distortions of reality can be explained by
cognitive biases documented in psychology literature. The one that we address in this
paper is attribution bias.
Attribution bias refers to the tendency to attribute good outcomes to our superior
ability, while attributing bad outcomes to bad luck or other external forces. The result
is overconfidence in personal ability. Overconfidence can lead to suboptimal
management behaviors, such as overinvestment. On the other hand, confidence is also
positively related to motivation levels, which could mitigate some of the ill effects of
overconfidence. In the short-term, overconfidence may reduce the probability that the
firm will fail, due to the entrepreneur refusing to quit even when quitting is the most
rational decision. Ultimately, however, a failing firm must fail, so a longer horizon study
should reveal a kinked or curvilinear relationship between overconfidence and firm
failure over time, where overconfidence reduces probability of failure in the short-run yet
increases that probability of failure in the long-run. This is a topic for further study.
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APPENDIX A:
Proof of Equation 13 (capped inequality)
:
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Mathematical support for part (a) of Lemma 1:
Using Equation (10), the critical overconfidence level that equates the values of the risky
and safe projects is

ˆ11 

2S
R 2 .

Using Equation (7), we define the critical level of overconfidence at which the
entrepreneur will switch from the safe to the risky project as

ˆ1 

4S
.
R 2
2
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